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factoring, and venture capital companies to various types  Vittas focuses on contractual savings institutions,
of contractual savings and institutional investors (pension  namely pension funds and life insurance companies, that
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This is a slightly revised version of a paper presented  at the Conference
"Towards  an Efficient Financial  System in Egypt",  organized  by the
Egyptian  Center  for Economic Studies in Cairo on February  26 and 27, 1997.INTRODUCTIONI
Non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) comprise a mixed bag of institutions.
Traditionally, they included all financial institutions that were not classified as commercial
banks.  But with the assimilation of building societies and other thrift deposit institutions with
commercial banks as institutions that accept deposits AND make loans, NBFIs have come to
mainly include leasing, factoring and venture capital companies as well as various types of
contractual savings and institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual
fimds). The common characteristic of these institutions is that they mobilize savings and
facilitate the financing of different activities, but do not accept deposits from the public at large.
NBFIs play an important dual role in the financial system.  They complement the role of
commercial banks, filling gaps in their range of services, but they also compete with commercial
banks and force them to be more efficient and responsive to the needs of their customers. Most
NBFIs are also actively involved in the securities markets and in the mobilization and allocation
olf  long-term financial resources.  The state of development of NBFIs is usually a good indicator
oif  the state of development of the financial system as a whole. 2
This paper is mainly focused on contractual savings institutions, namely pension funds
and life insurance companies, that are by far the most important NBFIs.  However, before
discussing their role and the determinants of their growth, the paper offers a brief review of the
role and growth of leasing and factoring companies. There is also a brief discussion of the
insurance sector and venture capital companies and mutual funds.  Although the paper offers an
The comments  of Ahmed  Galal  and  other  discussants  at the conference  are gratefully  acknowledged  with
no implication.
2  The  exception  is when  the development  of commercial  banks  is held back by restrictive  regulations.  Korea
is often  given as  an example  of a country  where  NBFIs have  been encouraged  to grow  at the expense  of
commercial  banks  and where  by implication  the state of development  of NBFIs  may exaggerate  the overall
development  of the financial  system  (World  Bank 1989).
1overview of developments in selected countries in different regions of the world, a section is
devoted to an examinations of the recent growth of NBFIs, and especially of contractual savings
institutions and securities markets, in Egypt.  The paper concludes with a brief summary of
policy implications.
LEASING AND FACTORING
Leasing and factoring companies have experienced significant growth in most countries
around the world (Table 1). They enjoy a number of important advantages over traditional bank
lending (IFC 1996). Leasing companies retain ownership of the leased asset and are able to
repossess it more easily in cases of customer default.  They can thus overcome the effects of
weak collateral and enforcement regulations that hinder comrnercial bank lending to small and
medium size enterprises.  Leasing companies also benefit from the preferential tax treatment
conferred on investments in fixed assets and capital equipment.  They can apply the accelerated
depreciation allowances to profits originating from other business ventures, while sharing some
of the tax benefits with lessees.  Leasing companies employ specialist staff and follow more
focused procedures in their dealings with their customers. They are often established as joint
ventures between equipment manufacturers and financial institutions and thus benefit from the
technical support of their founders.  They thus enjoy important informational advantages over
commercial banks as well as better marketing strategies.
The use of specialized staff and procedures is perhaps the main strength of factoring
companies which usually have a much better collection record than commercial banks.  Thus,
leasing and factoring companies are ideally suited for supporting the financing and  growth of
small and medium size firms and can play a very important role in those countries where
economic and social development is dependent on a thriving SME sector.  Leasing companies
may also facilitate foreign direct investment as they are often established as joint ventures with
foreign institutions.  In this respect, they play an important role in the transfer of financial
technology and know-how.
2Leasing and factoring companies may also have a beneficial effect on the development of
the financial sector. They obtain term finance from commercial banks, allowing them to engage
in maturity transformation and earn a higher spread without undue risk. 3 But they can also raise
finance from other financial institutions such as pension funds and insurance companies,
providing profitable outlets for their accumulated financial resources.  Leasing companies have
stimulated the development of the corporate bond market in many countries by being among the
first issuers of medium to long term bonds. And more recently, by securitizing their receivables,
they have given a boost to asset-backed securitization.
The development of leasing and factoring requires the adoption of an appropriate
enabling regulatory framework, including a clear and supportive tax treatment, and an openness
to entry of specialized foreign firms that can transfer financial technology and provide links with
foreign manufacturers.  Many developing countries, starting with Korea in the late 1  970s, have
supported the establishment and growth of leasing and factoring companies.  The sector is today
far more developed in Asia, especially East Asia, although significant progress has also been
made in Latin America and Eastern Europe. The Arab world appears to be behind in the
development of leasing and factoring companies, as in most other areas of the financial sector,
although the basic regulatory framework has been established in a number of Arab countries,
including Tunisia, Morocco and more recently Egypt and Lebanon.
CONTRACTUAL SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS
As already noted, contractual savings institutions are by far the most important NBFIs.
They have the potential to accumulate vast amounts of long-term financial resources and to
literally transform the structure and functioning of capital markets.
3  This presumes that leasing and factoring companies have a diversified portfolio of creditworthy projects
and are well capitalized.  However, as highlighted by the recent experience of banks in Japan, Thailand and
other East Asian countries, this result would not obtain if the banks use specialized subsidiaries to by-pass
strict prudential controls and fail to apply normal prudential standards when they lend to their own leasing
and factoring subsidiaries.
3Countries vary considerably in the relative importance of their contractual savings
institutions.  We can usefully distinguish three levels of development:
*  countries where the assets of pension funds and. insurance companies correspond
to less than 10% of GDP;
*  countries where they are over 10% but less than 50%; and
*  countries where they exceed 50%, in some cases by a wide margin.
The first group covers most Latin American countries (with the exception of Brazil,
Colombia and most notably Chile), all Francophone African countries, and all Eastern European
and Asian countries (except the Asian countries listed below).
The second group covers Brazil and Colombia among Latin American countries, such
Asian countries as India, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Sri lanka, all MENA and
Anglophone African countries, and all continental European countries (except Scandinavian
countries as well as the Netherlands and Switzerland).
The third group covers mainly Anglo-American and Scandinavian countries (i.e. US,
Canada, UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Finlamd,  Norway and Sweden) as well
as Switzerland and the Netherlands among European countries, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and
Singapore among East Asian countries, South Africa and Chile.
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia among Arab countries bordering on the Mediterranean Sea
have total contractual savings in the region of 20% of GDP, while in Egypt the total assets of the
social insurance system, private pension funds and insurance companies are nearly 40% of GDP.
Despite basing their pension systems on the so-called scaled premium approach, 4 there are
important differences among the contractual savings sectors of these four Arab countries.
In Jordan, the assets mostly represent the accumulation of financial resources by the
Social Security Corporation.  This is financed with a 15% contribution rate and has benefited
4  A scaled-premium  approach  sets  the contribution  rate for a period  of 5 or 10  years (the period  of
equilibrium)  at a level that is adequate  to cover future  benefit  payments  after taking  into account  expected
net investment  income  and demographic  factors. The contribution  rate is reset at the end of each
equilibrium  period.
4both from a low dependency ratio (a small number of beneficiaries compared to the number of
contributors) and from a positive, though moderate, real rate of return.
Egypt applies a much higher contribution rate of 26% in its social insurance system.
Annual flows into the system are very large as both the system and the covered population are
very young.  However, the benefits of the large annual net inflows have been offset by highly
negative real returns earned in the late 1  980s and early 1  990s. 5
Morocco and Tunisia have social pension systems with much lower contribution rates
and more mature structures. These already face financial pressures with limited accumulated
resources.  However, both countries operate other social funds with surplus resources, in
particular the funds for family allowances.
All four countries have very young populations. Their social security systems may
benefit in the medium term from expansion of coverage.  However, a sounder basis for their
fiuture  evolution and greater contribution to financial sector development would be achieved if
the systems were based on individual accounts with a more direct link between contributions,
investment income, and benefits.
Contractual savings institutions experienced rapid growth in the 1  980s in most countries
of the third group (Table 2).  In four of these countries (the Netherlands, Switzerland, South
Africa, and the United Kingdom), the total assets of pension funds and insurance companies
exceeded 100% of GDP in the early 1990s, growing from less than 50% in 1970. Among East
Asian countries, Singapore and Malaysia have long had sizable contractual savings sectors, with
resources corresponding to between 50% and 70% of GDP, while in the 1980s, following the
radical reform of its social security system, the total assets of contractual savings institutions in
Despite imposing an inordinately high contribution rate of 26%, the social insurance system of Egypt
succeeded in suffering a reduction in the share of accumulated balances to GDP from 38% in 1988  to 32%
in 1993.  The culprit for this fall was the negative real rate of return of nearly 12% for most of this period
(World Bank 1994). At this rate, the real value of balances declines by 47% in five years and by 78% in 10
years. The real rate of return on social insurance balances improved in recent years.  It is now slightly
positive in real terms on new and reinvested funds, though the weighted average return on all balances is
still slightly below the rate of inflation (see below).
5Chile expanded from less than 1% in 1480 to 30% in 1990 ancl 52% in 1993. The main factors
explaining the high rate of growth in these countries were expansion of coverage and/or high
investment returns, especially in the 1980s.
Causes of Underdevelopnent
What accounts for the underdevelopment of contractual savings in different countries?  In
very poor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the low level of income and wealth is the
most important factor.  Poor households cannot afford to put aside large sums of money for their
future long-term needs.  Although high-growth poor countries experience a high rate of saving
(e.g. China and India in recent years), such saving is usually first placed in bank deposits and
other liquid instruments.  Reliance on the extended family and other informal support systems,
which is more prevalent in poor countries with large rural populations, is another factor.
In middle income countries, the main reasons for the underdevelopment of contractual
savings are high inflation and macroeconomic instability, a repressive regulatory framework, and
the existence of an unfunded and often badly designed social security system.  Each of these
factors can have important adverse effects on the development of contractual savings.
High inflation undermines the predictability of operations of pension funds and insurance
companies.  Although use of indexed instruments may mitigate the problem, indexation
mechanisms often break down in highly inflationary countries.  Repressive regulation has a
negative impact because it impedes competition, innovation and efficiency and leads to a
widespread and mutual mistrust between contractual savings institutions and their customers.
Finally, the existence of a badly designed and often unfunded social security system may crowd
out the development of contractual saving institutions, both by weakening the need for them and
by limiting the scope for their expansion through the imposition of high payroll taxes.
Among developed countries, the main factor explaining differences in the state of
development of contractual savings has been the existence or not of a social security system
promising more or less generous pensions and operating on an unfunded, pay-as-you-go basis.
The countries of Southern Europe, from Portugal to Turkey, fall under this pattern as well as
6Germany, Belgium and Austria.  In addition, the operation of unfunded or partially funded
occupational pension plans has been another contributory factor.6
Contractual Savings Institutions and the Capital Markets
Contractual savings institutions can play a very important role in the development of a
country's capital market.  This depends on the allocation of their assets, which varies
considerably from country to country, reflecting both historical traditions and differences in
regulation (Table 3).  Real assets, and especially equities, are heavily represented in the
portfolios of UK pension fumds. This is generally attributed to the equity cult that UK fumd
mnanagers  have developed since the mid- 1  960s in response to the high rates of inflation
experienced by the UK economy between 1960 and 1990.  But this pattern is also explained by
the absence of legally imposed minimum funding requirements and by the use of pension
obligations that are quasi-indexed to inflation. Real assets represent a smaller proportion of
pension fund assets in the United States and other Anglo-American countries and even smaller
ones in continental European countries.
In  continental Europe, pension funds (as well as life insurance companies) place the
largest part of their assets in governiLment,  corporate and mortgage bonds and in long-term loans.
This is partly the result of investment regulations and partly the result of a traditional emphasis
on conservative investment policies.  Although pension funds and insurance companies are
subject to upper limits on their holdings of equities (as well as overseas securities) and although
their managers are seeking either increases in these limits or their complete abolition, restricted
investments are well below the specified limits.  But a gradual shift of asset allocations of Dutch
and Swiss pension funds in favor of equity investments is taking place and this has major
implications for the size and liquidity of their respective national markets.
6  A proper  accounting  of contractual  savings  in different  countries  should  include  any resources  accumulated
by partially  funded  schemes,  even if these  are held in the form of "book  reserves"  and are totally  invested
in  the assets  of sponsoring  employers.  The mobilization  of resources  should be recorded  even if usage is
less  than  optimal.
7The pattern in other countries is similar to that of continental European countries.
Investment rules have generally favored bonds, except for South Africa, where pension funds and
life insurance companies have been free to invest in equities.  In Singapore, the Central Provident
Fund invests over 90% of its funds in specially-issued, nonmarketable and floating rate
government securities that earn a modest positive real rate of return.  In Malaysia, the funds of
the national provident fund are placed in government bonds, allhough investments in equities
have increased in recent years.  In both countries, individual workers are allowed to withdraw
funds for investment in housing and an increasingly broader range of approved securities. 7
In Chile, investments in corporate equities for the privaitely  managed pension funds were
less than 20% of total assets in the late 1980s, mainly because of the imposition of tight
restrictions on their investment portfolios.  The pension funds invested heavily in government,
mortgage and corporate bonds as well as bank deposits (Vittas 1995b). The gradual relaxation of
investment rules has allowed the Chilean pension funds to invest more in equities.  The limit on
equities has been raised to 30% of assets in the 1  990s while they were also allowed to invest in
foreign securities.
In the Arab countries covered in this paper, investment allocations have been subject to
direct government influence with the notable exception of Jordan, where any such influence has
been indirect. In Egypt, most of the vast resources of the social security system are handed over
to the National Investment Bank, which invests in public projects.  This is similar to what
happens in Malaysia, but with the important difference that in Malaysia the rate of return credited
to individual accounts has been positive in real terms.
In Tunisia and Morocco, contractual savings institutions have been required to invest in
low-yielding government paper, in low-interest housing loans, and even in building low-rent
housing units.  This has depressed investment income, although in recent years investment rules
7  These  allocations  are not included  in  the reported  statistics.
8have been substantially relaxed and new investment flows are now placed in assets yielding
rnarket rates of return.
In Jordan, the Social Security Corporation has enjoyed greater freedom from government
interference but investments have been constrained by the highly conservative policies of the
Corporation and by the shortage of attractive investment opportunities.  Increasingly, the
Corporation has been forced to place a growing percentage of its new flows into bank deposits,
although a new policy may be adopted in the future that emphasizes a more professional
aLpproach  in asset allocation and even manager selection practices.
In most countries around the world, investments in foreign assets have been constrained
by regulations, either foreign exchange controls or unnecessarily tight prudential controls.
Following the removal of exchange controls and the relaxation of investment rules, pension
finds  in several countries have built up substantial holdings of foreign equities and bonds,
reaching to well over 20% in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom and around 60%
in Hong Kong.
International diversification may increase portfolio returns, especially if pension funds
become too big for the local markets, but a more general result is a reduction in investment risk,
stemming from the less than perfect covariance of returns in different national markets.
Contractual savings institutions in most countries tend to display a strong "home bias" (Reisen
1996), which may be attributed to the nature of their liabilities, the absence of efficient hedging
facilities, and their preference for investing in markets and securities they know better.
Nevertheless, international diversification has been growing fast.  Most countries, especially
those with undiversified economies dominated by a few industries and a few family groups,
should allow some foreign investments once a new pension system is well established.
Impact on Capital Market Efficiency
The impact of contractual savings institutions on capital market efficiency depends on
their size, their investment policies and their management practices.  From a quantitative point of
view, there is a certain correlation between the size of contractual savings and the development
9of equity markets, but the pattenn is far from clear (table 4).  The equity market is very large (in
relation to GDP) in the United Kingdom and South Africa where pension funds invest heavily in
equities, but it is also very large in Switzerland and Chile, where pension funds invest relatively
little in equities.  Also, in Malaysia and Singapore, the equity raarket is very large with high
trading volumes even though direct investments by the respective provident funds in equities are
either minuscule or nonexistent.  Other investors, especially foreign institutional investors,
probably account for the large capitalization of the equity markets, and the large volume of
trading, in these two countries.
Levine and Zervos (1995) emphasized the importance of the value of trading as an
indicator of market efficiency, low transaction costs and market liquidity.  They found that
market liquidity is positively and robustly correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of
economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth.  Recent years have witnessed
very big increases in trading volumes in many stock markets around the world as well as growing
equity markets, measured in terms of market capitalization in relation to GDP (Tables 5 and 6).
In countries, such as Malaysia and Singapore, the growing internationalization of
portfolio investing must clearly be a major factor in the veritable explosion of trading volumes
on their equity markets. From 7% of GDP in 1985 (admittedly a recession year with depressed
market prices and activity) trading volume exploded to 250% in Malaysia and 150% in
Singapore in 1993 (though trading volumes suffered substantial falls  in 1994). In contrast, in
European countries, in addition to international investors, domestic institutional investors must
also have contributed to the growth of trading volumes. This is especially in those countries
where contractual savings institutions are in the process of redefining their investment policies in
favor of equity holdings.  Swiss trading volume was much higher than those of the US and UK
markets in 1993, while the Dutch and Swedish markets reached in 1993 the level of the UK
market in 1990.
Chile and South Africa continued to have subdued levels of equity trading, probably
because of continuing restrictions on foreign portfolio investment. The low level of equity
10trading in Chile and South Africa is also attributed to the "buy and hold" strategy of pension
funds, although market liquidity has increased in all three countries. Among Arab countries,
Jordan has a reasonably high level of trading activity.  The stock exchanges of the other 3
countries are still at an early stage of development, although considerable progress has been
rnade in very recent years.
Contractual savings institutions have the potential to act as catalysts for the
nnodernization  of securities markets, the development of efficient trading and settlement systems,
the adoption of modern accounting and auditing standards, and the promotion of infornation
disclosure.  In the United States, the growing market power of pension funds and insurance
companies has undermined the dominance of corporate bond markets by the traditional
investment banks, that long after the passing of the Glass-Steagall Act in the 1930s continued to
operate effectively as a cartel, with rigid hierarchical structures in syndicated issues.  Institutional
investors have been a major contributing factor to the advent of competitive bidding for
corporate issues, the abolition of minimum commissions on equity trading and the restructuring
of stock exchanges (Chernow 1990). The hedging needs of US corporate pension funds,
operating under strict minimum funding requirements, have been instrumental in stimulating the
development of immunization techniques and new products, such as zero-coupon bonds and
collateralized mortgage obligations as well as index options and futures (Bodie 1990, Davis
1995). More recently, institutional investors have become more actively involved in monitoring
corporate performance and exerting direct and indirect pressure for better and more effective
structures of corporate governance.
The role of pension funds and insurance companies in the capital markets has also come
under criticism for allegedly causing greater market volatility, adopting a short-termist attitude
on investments, and neglecting the financing needs of smaller firms.  Because they trade more
actively, institutional investors increase the liquidity of markets and lower volatility.  However,
For an excellent survey of corporate governance issues with extensive coverage of some highly publicized
failures, see Monks and Minow (1995).
11their proneness to herding behavior exposes markets to sudden changes of sentiment that may
cause abrupt fluctuations in prices.  The evidence on short-terrmism  is also somewhat mixed and
not particularly strong.  Moreover, recent developments underscore the growing involvement of
pension funds and insurance companies in corporate governance issues and suggest an increasing
concern for the long-term performance of the corporate sector.  Nevertheless, fund managers are
themselves subject to short-term performance evaluations and are therefore forced to pay close
attention to short-term prospects.  With regard to financing smaller firms, contractual savings
institutions need to rely on other specialist institutions such as banks as well as leasing, factoring
and venture capital companies.
THE  INSURANCE SECTOR
The insurance sector comprises life and nonlife (also known as casualty and property)
insurance companies.  Their development varies considerably across countries (Table 7).  It has
been influenced by the same factors that determine the growth of contractual savings institutions.
In fact, life insurance companies are a main component of contractual savings because they offer
whole life and endowment insurance policies as well as a growing variety of annuity products.
Nonlife insurance companies generate a relatively smaller amount of financial assets deriving
from the reserves they set aside to cover future claims.
Income and wealth, macrofinancial stability, and the regulatory framework are the main
determinants of insurance business as they are of contractual savings more generally. In many
developing countries, including most Arab countries, the main line of insurance business is
compulsory motor insurance, which is often subject to regulated and low premiums.  Motor
insurance produces large technical losses, which force insurance companies to scrutinize claims
and delay their settlement.  In many cases, large court awards complicate matters as claimants
prefer to go to court rather than accept reasonable settlements by insurance companies.  A
climate of mistrust has evolved over time between insurance companies and their clients.  This
12has had adverse effects not only on motor insurance but also on the development of other
personal lines, including household and life insurance.
In many developing countries, large industrial and commercial risks are reinsured with
international reinsurance companies.  This protects the domestic market from excessive retention
of risks, but it also implies that the domestic market does not develop the capacity to price and
retain risks locally. However, in countries where local retention has been enforced and where the
reinsurance business has been declared a state monopoly, the financial and insurance results have
been disastrous.
In most countries around the world, including East Asia, Latin America and Eastern
]_urope, insurance business has experienced considerable growth.  In the Arab world insurance
business has stagnated and has suffered declines in relation to GDP.  In large part, this may be
attributed to the underdevelopment of life insurance.  Whereas in many countries around the
world the share of life premiums in total premiums has been growing fast, reaching or exceeding
60%, it has hovered around 20% or less in Arab countries (Table 8).
The development of life insurance is often affected by the existence of a credible social
security system and/or the offer of well funded company pensions based on defined benefit
plans.  But in countries where the security of social pensions is in doubt, life insurance business
rnay benefit as workers seek alternative means for security their old age financial needs.  For
instance, life insurance has been growing very fast in France where both social security and
company pensions are unfunded.
But life insurance business also receives a great boost in countries that rely on defined
contribution pension plans since workers purchase annuity products when they retire.  The rapid
growth of life insurance business in Chile is attributed to the pension reform program that was
implemented in the early 1  980s. The life insurance sector also benefited from the compulsory
purchase of term life and disability insurance. This is needed to protect workers and their
families from the financial consequences of serious accidents and death before reaching
retirement.
13In Arab countries, cultural and religious factors may also explain the underdevelopment
of life insurance.  However, the repressive regulatory environment, lack of competition and
product innovation, and the prevailing mistrust of insurance companies have probably been of
greater significance.  After all, life insurance represents nearly 50% of total premiums in
Malaysia, where life business corresponds to 2.30% of GDP against 0.16% in Egypt and 0.  12%
in Tunisia.
VENTURE  CAPITAL  COMPANIES  AND MUTUAL  FUNDS
These two types of institutions are the latest additions l:o  NBFIs, although they have
existed in one form or another for a long time.  Their role has lbecome  more important in recent
years as a result of the growth of pension funds and other contractual savings institutions.
Venture capital companies (VCCs) specialize in financing small firnns and new ventures.
Increasingly, they become involved in financing infrastructure and other major projects that
governments delegate to the private sector for more efficient construction and management.  The
main characteristics of VCCs is that they offer both equity ancl  debt finance and take a more
active and specialist interest in the management of the ventures they support. Their approach is
described not as "hands-off' as with traditional commercial banking, but rather as "hands-on" but
with "gloves-off". VCCs expect sizable losses on some projects but operate on the principle that
a few successful ventures will cover most losses and will leave a substantial profit to compensate
their founders for the risks assumed.
VCCs play an instrumental role in the provision of high tech finance in the United States
and in supporting the emergence of large numbers of new ventures in such areas as computing
and electronics, biotechnology, etc. Their successful operation requires an enabling regulatory
framework and an environment that is conducive to private sector initiatives.  Access to long-
term financial resources and an active market allowing the disposal of stakes and exit from
individual companies once the latter are well established are also essential.
14Mutual funds investing in equities or bonds have been developed over time as means for
conferring to small individual investors the benefits of professional fund management and
efficient risk diversification.  Their number has proliferated in recent years, especially in the
financial systems of high income countries.  There are now mutual funds specializing by sector
or by  country or region as well as mutual funds following active investment management
policies or passive ones using published indices of various types of securities.
The proliferation of specialized mutual funds has allowed their use by pension funds and
other institutional investors for their asset allocation, provided a reduced management fee can be
negotiated.  Pension funds and other institutional investors clearly lack the specialist skills
needed to invest in particular economic sectors or in particular regions or countries.  Using well
established and successful mutual funds is an economically viable and efficient alternative.
Mutual funds, in the form of venture capital ftnds,  are also  established by successful
venture capitalists.  Such funds have also become an important outlet for the financial resources
controlled by pension funds and other institutional investors.  Institutional investors often lack
the skills for dealing with small firms and new ventures, both in selecting promising projects and
in monitoring their performance.  Participating in venture capital funds, that may also be listed
on the stock exchange and may thus be easy to dispose, is an effective alternative that is gaining
popularity around the world.  Such fimds or investment trusts may also be used for financing
infrastructure projects, real estate development, and other forms of private equity.  The latter
usually offers higher returns than publicly listed and traded equity and is also gaining in
popularity among institutional investors in America, Europe and Asia.
Venture capital companies and mutual funds are not very advanced in the Arab world,
although the legal foundations for their creation and growth have been established in all four
Arab countries covered in this paper.  The prospects for these types of NBFIs look very
promising, especially if sound macrofinancial policies continue to be pursued and the countries
concerned are able to reform successfully their contractual savings sectors and especially their
social security and pension systems.
15RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS  IN EGYPT 9
The NBFI sector in Egypt is poised to make a significant contribution to economic
development following recent policy changes.'0 First, enabling legislation for the creation of
leasing companies and mutual funds has been enacted.  Second, the privatization program has
been pursued with renewed vigor.  Third, the modernization of ithe  securities markets has reached
a critical stage.  Fourth, the reform of the insurance industry has continued to progress with a
revised regulatory framework and greater emphasis on competition and innovation.  And, fifth,
the financial performance of the Social Insurance System (SIS) has been improved with the rise
of interest rates paid on new and reinvested balances.
The Social Insurance  System  (SIS)
The SIS is by far the most important component of the NBFI sector in Egypt.  It provides
pension benefits and insurance against disability, death, and loss of earnings due to
unemployment or illness. It covers 83% of the workforce, although this is because farmers are
only required to make a nominal contribution of 1 Egyptian potmd against which they receive a
minimum pension of 45 Egyptian pounds.
The system dependency ratio is high at 38% despite the young age of the Egyptian
population and the young age of the system.  This is due in part to the inclusion of spouses,
children and other relatives among surviving dependents.  Excluding children and other relatives,
the system dependency ratio falls to 28%.  This is still double the demographic old age
dependency ratio and is explained by the low retirement age for women and the young age of
surviving spouses.
The SIS is financed from employer and employee contributions, from government
transfers, and from investment income earned on its very large balances.  Contribution rates vary
9  This section draws extensively on a chapter prepared by Albert Martinez of the World Bank for the latest
economic report  (country economic memorandum or CEM) on Egypt.
10  For a review of the financial sector of Egypt before the recent policy reforms, see World Bank (1993).
16depending on the type of wage (basic or variable) and the type of employer (private sector
enterprises, public sector enterprises or government offices). A total contribution rate of 26% is
assessed for old age, disability and survivorship pensions, but the contribution rate for other
beenefits  varies from 5% to 15%.
Revenues from payroll contributions declined from 5.1% of GDP in fiscal 1986 to 3.5%
in fiscal 1995 (Table 9).  This is probably explained by the ceiling that is imposed on covered
wages.  Government transfers include a 1% formal contribution plus transfers to cover the ad hoc
inflation adjustments for basic pensions.  Revenues from government transfers grew from 1.2%
of GDP in fiscal 1986 to 1.5% in fiscal 1995, although they were around 1% for most of the
intervening years.  Investment income (net of operating expenses) rose from the equivalent of 2%
of GDP in 1986 to 2.8% in 1995. Its share of total SIS revenues increased from 24% in fiscal
11986  to 36% in fiscal 1995. This reflects the growing accumulated balances of  SIS and the
increased rate of interest paid on them in recent years.
The cost of pension benefits amounted to 2.5% of GDP in 1986. This fell to 2% in 1990
as a result of the adverse impact of inflation on the real value of pensions--especially the variable
wage pensions that did not benefit from the ad hoc adjustments conferred on basic wage
pensions.  But the cost rate of pensions reversed to 2.5% of GDP in 1995. This left an annual
surplus of 5.3% of GDP, up from 4.6% in 1990 but down from 5.8% in 1986. The total balances
of SIS fell from 38% in fiscal 1986 to 33% in fiscal 1995, with a low point of 29% of GDP in
1  992.
As already noted above, this decline has been caused by the highly negative real returns
earned by SIS for most of the 1980s. While inflation averaged 18%, SIS balances received a
nominal rate of interest of 5% to 6%.  Had the balances earned a zero real rate of interest, they
would have been 60% higher at the end of 1995 and would thus have amounted to well over 50%
of GDP.
The balances of SIS are invested with the National Investment Bank (NIB), which
finances public projects and public enterprises in accordance with the economic plan.  Starting
17July 1992, the NIB raised the ate of interest on incremental social security funds (i.e. new funds
plus reinvested balances) to 13% in nominal terms.  This rate is higher than the current bank term
deposit rate of 12% but lower than the 17% paid on NIB investment certificates. It is also higher
than inflation which averaged 10% in the period 1992-96.
Although the rate of interest is now positive in real terms, it should be noted that this is
paid only on incremental funds. According to NIB data, the new deposits from SIS amounted to
23.4 billion Egyptian pounds or 35% of the total balances of SIS of 67 billion pounds.  Assuming
that the remaining 65% earns on average 5.5% yields a weighted rate of interest on all balances
of slightly over 8%, which is still below the rate of inflation and thus negative in real terms.
Nevertheless, the current situation represents a major improverment  over the 1  980s, while the
weighted average rate of interest will gradually reach 13%.
Yet despite these improvements, the fact remains that the balances of SIS are not used
efficiently and provide little direct support to the development of the capital markets and the
promotion of the private sector. A fundamental but gradual reform of the pension system is
essential.  This could involve first the conversion of the system from a defined benefit  into a
defined contribution scheme, followed by a privatization of its investment function (with the
possibility to invest in corporate equities and bonds) and the an option to employees to contract
out  to approved schemes operated by employers or by specialized financial institutions.
Private Pension Funds
The need to improve the pension system is heightened by the weak actuarial position of
most of the 500 or so private pension funds that operate in Egypt and offer defined benefit
pensions but without full funding.  The number of these funds has been increasing very rapidly
from 330 in 1991 to over 500 in 1995. They cover nearly half a million workers, up from
200,000 in 1991 and their total reserves amount to 3.3 billion pounds, up from 1.4 billion in
1991. A majority of these funds are established by employees of public sector entities with only
about 10% set up by private sector enterprises.  The reserves are invested in bank deposits (48%)
18and government bonds (42%).  Thus the private pension funds also make little direct contribution
to the financing of the private sector and the development of the capital markets.
The Insurance Sector
Regulatory and institutional changes are also occurring in the insurance sector.  A new
insurance law was enacted in 1995 and a new set of regulations was adopted in June 1996. These
brought the regulatory framework in line with the prevailing approach in Europe. This
emphasizes solvency monitoring and prudential regulations and leaves premium setting to the
interplay of market forces.  Except for motor vehicle and fire insurance, which will be
deregulated in 1999, premiums in all other lines have been liberalized and price control has been
replaced with price reporting.
There are now 10 insurance companies operating in Egypt.  The sector is dominated by
the large state-owned companies which control collectively over 90% of the market.  However, a
new emphasis on competition and innovation is likely to result in privatizations as well as in
opening the domestic market to foreign competition.
The Capital Markets
Various measures have been taken to revitalize the capital markets, with special emphasis
on the market for corporate equities.  New legislation--the Capital Markets Law-- was passed in
1992 and executive regulations issued in 1993. These sought to strengthen the Capital Market
Authority (CMA), reorganize and modernize the stock exchanges, including the establishment of
new trading, clearing and settlement systems, and improve information disclosure.  The creation
of mutual funds has been authorized and 15 licensed mutual funds have been created as of June
1996.
The development of the stock market has been stimulated by the spate of privatizations,
the increase in the number of listed companies, and the inflow of foreign capital, both for direct
19and portfolio investment purposes.  Market capitalization reached 20% of GDP in 1996, up from
10% in 1993, while trading activity amounted to 3.4% of GDP, up from 0.2% in 1993.
POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  AND CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion from the preceding analysis is that NBFIs complement the services
provided by banking institutions and also represent a countervailing force to their dominant role,
forcing them to be more competitive and efficient.  NBFIs provide a strong stimulus to the
development of the capital markets, generating large amounts of long-term financial resources,
and creating new sources of  supply and demand for marketable securities.
For leasing, factoring and venture capital companies, which mostly deal with financial
professionals or, at worst, businessmen and entrepreneurs, the main precondition for their
creation and growth is enactment of an enabling regulatory framework, including a clear and
supportive tax treatment.  Openness to foreign participation to ensure availability of the specialist
skills and transfer of financial technology and know-how would also be very helpful.  If such
companies provide loans to consumers, or obtain funds from nonprofessional investors, they
should be subject to the same consumer and investor protection regulations as other financial
institutions.
The promotion of pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds requires more
fundamental changes and presupposes the existence of a more robust and elaborate regulatory
and supervisory framework. In particular, the establishment of private pension funds may also
depend on the implementation of more basic and systemic social security reform.  Systemic
pension reform is difficult to implement because it has many and far-reaching economic,
financial, political and social implications.  However, many coumtries  around the world,
"  Similar  developments  were observed  in several  other  developing  countries,  reflecting  the growing
importance  of equity  markets. Among  Arab countries,  total market  capitalization  reached  25% of GDP in
Morocco  and 20% in Tunisia  in 1996. In contrast,  market  capitalization,  and especially  trading  activity,
fell sharply  in Jordan,  where  they amounted  respectively  to 64% and 4.2% of GDP,  down from 87%  and
25% in 1993.
20especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe (as well as most OECD countries) are forced to
take action to restructure and downsize their unfunded or partially funded social security systems
anld  create more room for mandatory or voluntary private pension funds.  At the same time, most
countries take measures to reform and enhance the efficiency of their insurance sectors, since
systemic pension reform cannot succeed without a sound, innovative, and competitive insurance
sector (Vittas 1995c).
Most Arab countries have partially funded defined benefit social security systems. These
still generate surpluses, because both the systems and the underlying covered populations are
young.  Moreover, the relative underdevelopment of the financial system and the absence of a
long tradition of private pension funds and professional fund management act as disincentives for
systemic pension reform for governments that are faced with more pressing problems.  Despite
these difficulties, Arab countries would be well advised to start a gradual reform of their social
security and pension systems.  This is both in order to avoid the problems facing European
countries when demographic aging raises the cost of defined benefit schemes and in order to reap
the beneficial effects of capital market development.
As a first step in the direction of reform, Arab countries would do well to convert their
defined benefit schemes into defined contribution ones, while keeping a centralized public
system in place as well as centralized fund management.  Once this step is completed, the
authorities should consider allowing private firms and individual workers to contract out of the
public system, provided they join a new scheme of similar or improved conditions.  In addition,
their centralized agencies could start delegating the investment management function to
authorized private asset managers.  To ensure that retiring workers receive a minimum pension
firom  their retirement savings, the authorities could offer a public pension, financed from payroll
taxes or from general tax revenues or a combination of the two, or they could offer to make up
any shortfall in the pension obtained from a worker's retirement savings.
This gradualist approach would avoid the immense regulatory burden that would be
entailed in a full and immediate privatization of the pension system.  However, with or without a
21gradualist  approach,  it is important  to emphasize  that an efficient  and stable financial  system
presupposes  satisfaction  of the following  three basic  conditions  (Honohan  and Vittas 1996).
First, existence  of operationally  autonomous  central  banks,  able to set interest  rates and credit
conditions  with a view to protecting  the value of the currency  and the stability  of the financial
system. Second,  presence  of autonomous  commercial  banks (and other  financial  institutions)
that operate as profit centers  and are not captive  of their borrowers  or the government. This
would  imply that not only the financial  system  but also industry  and commerce  are largely  in
private  hands. Third,  attainment  of a legal and administrative  framework  that is conducive  to the
well  functioning  and enforceability  of financial  contracts. Inherent  in the second  condition
mentioned  above is openness  to the international  markets and foreign  presence  that is essential
for the transfer  of skills  and technologies. Such  openness  is in many  respects  far more important
for the more specialist  functions  performed  by NBFIs.
22Table 1
Leasing in Selected Countries
(% of private investment)
1988  1990  1993
United States  32  32  32
United Kingdom  20  20  19
Australia  33  25  20
Spain  26  28  18
Sweden  27  15  20
Ireland  19  28  43
Portugal  10  10  24
Korea  13  16  23
Indonesia  6  9  14
Colombia  1  6  21
Hungary  8  18
Venezuela  12  8  15
Source:  IFC (1996)
23ITable 2
Pension Fund and Life Insurance Assets in Selected Countries
(%  of GDP)
1970  1980  19,90  1993
Netherlands  45  63  1  1D  124
Sweden  42  51  60  76
Switzerland  51  70  105  130
UK  43  46  97  145
US  40  46  74  90
Chile  1  31  52
Malaysia*  18  21  51  58
Singapore*  17  41  68  68
South Africa  40  47  81  121
Egypt  39  34  36
Jordan  10  17  19
Morocco  12  18
Tunisia  1C  12
*  The data do not include the funds invested directly by individual workers in housing and
other approved assets. Although Singapore  is a high income country, it is classified in
this paper with developing countries because of the historical interest of its performance.
Source:  Davis (1995) and national central banks.
24Table 3
Asset Allocation of Pension Funds in Selected Countries, 1990
(%  of assets)
(Of which
Real Assets  Equities)  Debt
Instruments
Netherlands  31  (20)  69
Sweden  ..  (.)
Switzerland  33  (16)  67
UK  72  (63)  28
US  46  (46)  54
Chile  20  (20)  80
Malaysia*  2  (2)  98
Singapore*  2  (2)  98
South Africa  60  (55)  40
Egypt**  5  (.)  95
Jordan**  25  (15)  75
Morocco**  15  (.)  85
Tunisia"  15  (. )  85
*  Does not include the direct investments in housing and approved securities by individual
workers.
**  Rough estimates.
Source:  Davis (1995); Vittas (1995a)
25Table 4
Contractual Savings and Equity Markets in Selected Countries, 1993
(%  of GDP)
Contractual  Equity  Value
Savings  Market  Traded
Equities
Netherlands  124  61  23
Sweden  76  62  25
Switzerland  130  117  72
UK  145  123  45
US  90  82  55
Chile  52  104  7
Malaysia  58  365  255
Singapore  68  240  147
South Africa  121  153  12
Egypt  36  8  0.2
Jordan  19  85  24
Morocco  18  9  1.6
Tunisia  12  7  0.3
Source:  Tables 2, 5 and 6
26Table 5
Equity Markets in Selected Countries
(%  of GDP)
1980  1985  1990  1993
Netherlands  18.6  38.7  39.2  61.4
Sweden  10.6  32.8  38.6  61.8
Switzerland  44.4  82.0  66.0  117.2
UK  37.1  63.6  79.9  123.3
US  45.7  57.6  56.0  82.4
Chile  ..  13.9  59.6  103.6
Malaysia  ..  50.7  113.4  365.1
Singapore  ..  60.1  90.4  239.5
South Africa  123.9  115.1  127.6  152.5
Egypt  ..  4.9  5.0  9.7
Jordan  ..  44.7  49.8  87.3
Morocco  ..  1.9  3.7  9.9
Tunisia  ..  6.8  4.3  6.5
Source:  International Finance Corporation
27Table 6
Value of Equity Trading in Selected Countries
(%  of GDP)
1980  1985  1990  1993
Netherlands  3.0  11.0  13.2  22.7
Sweden  1.4  8.4  6.6  25.1
Switzerland  ..  ..  28.9  72.4
UK  6.6  13.3  26.2  45.3
US  15.1  24.7  32.9  55.3
Chile  ..  0.4  2.8  6.5
Malaysia  ..  7.2  25.4  254.7
Singapore  ..  7.6  53.5  147.3
South Africa  6.6  5.8  7.6  11.5
Egypt  ..  0.3  0.2  0.2
Jordan  ..  3.2  10.1  24.6
Morocco  ..  0.1  0.2  1.9
Tunisia  ..  0.1  0.1  0.3
Source:  International Finance CorporationTable 7
Life and Non-Life Insurance Premiums in Selected Countries
(%  of GDP)
1985  1990  1994
Netherlands  5.60  8.08  8.80
Sweden  4.72  4.83  6.40
Switzerland  7.07  8.03  9.74
UK  7.11  9.67  11.43
US  7.52  8.89  8.57
Chile  2.16  2.97  3.30
Malaysia  2.79  3.09  4.65
Singapore  2.40  3.20  4.22
South Africa  7.22  10.60  12.77
Egypt  1.00  0.89  0.79
Jordan
Morocco  1.84  1.92  2.65
Tunisia  1.63  1.51  1.71
Source:  Sigma, Swiss Reinsurance
29Table 8
Share of Life Insurance in Total Insurance Premiums in Selected Countries
(%  of total premiums)
1985  1990  1994
Netherlands  46.6  51.7  51.3
Sweden  57.1  52.0  54.8
Switzerland  53.3  55.9  61.5
UK  59.8  64.5  63.9
US  37.9  42.6  42.4
Chile  52.4  59.6  59.1
Malaysia  41.9  44.3  49.5
Singapore  39.5  56.3  64.7
South Africa  76.8  80.0  80.8
Egypt  18.0  18.0  20.3
Jordan  ..  ..
Morocco  18.1  19.3  21.1
Tunisia  5.2  8.6  7.0
Source:  Sigma, Swiss Reinsurance
30Table 9
Revenues of the Social Insurance System of Egypt
(% of GDP)
Contributions  Transfers  Investment  Total
Income
Fiscal
1986  5.1  1.2  2.0  8.3
1990  3.6  0.9  2.1  6.6
1995  3.5  1.5  2.8  7.8
(% of total revenues)
Fiscal
1986  61  15  24  100
1990  54  14  32  100
1995  45  19  36  100
Source:  Ministry of Social Affairs and World Bank
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